

## CHAPTER 15

# Balancing Local and Regional Interests

Thomas Skuzinski, Virginia Tech

This chapter is about the space state governments create for cooperation among general-purpose local governments, and how the individuals working in local governments make decisions within that space. We will refer to the relationships among two or more local governments—the cities, towns, counties, and similar units that serve a broad, general purpose spanning many policy areas—as *interlocal* relations in the rest of this chapter. Local governments often work together to efficiently or effectively deliver public services or to solve complex policy problems. For example, several neighboring communities can adopt a joint strategy for attracting economic development to their region.<sup>1</sup> A large city might provide water treatment to several suburbs.<sup>2</sup> A group of coastal communities might work together to promote disaster resilience.<sup>3</sup>

While the focus throughout much of this book is on relationships among *governments*, these relationships must be formed and maintained by people. In other words, intergovernmental relations are human relations.<sup>4</sup> To help us understand these human relations in the interlocal context, we will be using a series of simple questions that we should use whenever we are trying to understand why cooperation occurs. Some of these questions will explore the attributes, preferences, and behaviors of the administrative staff and elected officials responsible for shaping intergovernmental relationships. Others will target the decision-making context in which they function.

The goal of the chapter is to use these questions and illustrative examples to develop a simple framework for making sense of cooperation among local governments. You should come away from reading it with two key insights, which we will revisit in the conclusion. The first is that the state plays a dominant role through its ability to define the limits of what local governments can and cannot do with regard to other local governments. If we want to understand the possibility for interlocal cooperation, we must first look to what state governments have said about these actions through provisions in state constitutions and state statutes. The second is that cooperation, to the extent a state has left that option open as a voluntary action by local governments, is never thoroughly predictable. For example, even if a state allows interlocal cooperation,

and even if it seems like a sensible choice given the actors involved and the context in which they are making decisions, we still might find that it does not occur. If you work in or with local governments in your career, you are likely to encounter examples of cooperation flourishing among governments despite numerous obstacles, or failing despite seeming like an obvious and easy option. Because interlocal relations are human relations, they can often be messy and inexplicable. But the framework in this chapter should equip you with the tools and knowledge to make sense of most situations.

The chapter is organized around three big questions. First, we will ask, *What does state law say about interlocal relations?* We will look at how states can expressly enable cooperation, and how they can indirectly increase or decrease its potential. Second, we will consider, *What are some of the contexts in which cooperation tends to happen?* We will be thinking through the socio-economic, institutional, and organizational settings that tend to be favorable. Third, we will explore, *What are the characteristics of the individuals who tend to support cooperation?*, with primary attention given to distinctions between elected officials and administrative staff. In each section, we will walk through illustrative examples.

A note before moving forward: local governments also compete with one another. This is not surprising if we think about the nature of local government boundaries. These boundaries define where local governments have policy authority—that is, where the laws they adopt and implement can operate on individuals, households, and businesses—and also limit the people, land, and goods from which a local government can collect taxes and fees to fulfill its many public responsibilities. A common strategy for a local government is to try to compete successfully against other local governments for new households moving into the region, or for businesses shopping for a new location. Sometimes this takes the form of highly visible competition for international corporate activity, as was evident in the recent contest over the location of Amazon’s HQ2.<sup>5</sup> A more commonplace example, though, is the decision to adopt zoning regulations that favor large, single-family homes over multifamily apartment complexes targeting middle- or lower-income households.<sup>6</sup> Local governments can also engage in what is commonly known as yardstick competition, in which they use peer local governments as comparisons—or “yardsticks”—against which to measure their tax rates and fees and the bundle of public goods and services they offer. Despite the commonness of competition as a strategy, you should not think of cooperation as exceptional. A recent study of more than 1,500 municipalities found that the average one provides about thirty-six services, and that about eight of these are provided through cooperation.<sup>7</sup> We single out cooperation in this chapter both because it is common and because it requires an intentional shift away from the default position in which local governments exist.

## What Does State Law Say about Interlocal Relations?

Each state uses its laws to define the types of local government (e.g., cities, towns, boroughs, villages), how they form, and how much power they have in various policy domains. These laws are not static: they change over time, and so too can the behavior of local governments in response to such changes. A 2010 study found that, on average, 20 percent of all state legislation concerned the form or function of local governments,<sup>8</sup> and that these vary in the extent to which they are empowering or restricting.<sup>9</sup> While no study has directly explored the share of this state activity targeted at influencing interlocal relations specifically, it is likely that much of it at least indirectly does by shaping the resources and autonomy with which decision makers can work. State laws can motivate cooperative interlocal relations in three ways: (1) by creating conditions in which a local government is responsible for producing or providing a service but may lack the fiscal capacity to do so effectively (at a high enough level of quality) or efficiently (at a low enough unit cost) on its own, (2) by limiting the ability of a local government to increase its territorial footprint to meet its policy goals, or (3) by expressly enabling interlocal cooperation.

State governments articulate through laws the service responsibilities of local governments and the revenue streams these governments can potentially access to pay for these services. When resources are scarce, the capacity to directly produce and provide services may be constrained. There are many possible responses to this. If a local government opts to continue with direct production and provision, it may have to strategically reduce expenditures by lowering the quantity or quality of a service or increase the revenues flowing from that service by raising taxes or fees. But a local government might find that contracting with another entity is more efficient, whether that entity is a private contractor or another government. Cooperation is, therefore, one of a suite of responses to resource scarcity.<sup>10</sup>

A local government that is constrained from growing its territorial footprint (i.e., from expanding its boundaries to encompass more land) might also be more likely to cooperate with neighboring local governments to meet policy goals, though no research has been undertaken to support this reasoning. Consistent with this logic, though, some researchers have found that having more neighboring local governments—those with adjacent boundaries—can increase the likelihood of cooperation. Such territorial shifts can occur through the process of annexation or—less commonly—through the merger or consolidation of two or more units of government.<sup>11</sup> The processes through which these structural changes occur are defined by the state and can vary quite a bit. Under the most lenient form, a local government can unilaterally take unincorporated land—that which is not part of an incorporated municipality already—with minimal state involvement. Under more restrictive forms, the government acquiring new land and the one giving it must mutually agree to the transfer, and the state must approve of it under stringent requirements. In North Carolina, local governments had for decades the ability to easily annex land outside

their current boundaries, and they still retain much of this ability. Charlotte grew in size from about 19 square miles (50 square kilometers) in 1940 to 140 square miles (362 square kilometers) in 1980, to nearly 298 square miles (about 770 square kilometers) in 2010.<sup>12</sup> The increase in size means an increase in population and an increase in both the service responsibilities and the revenue-generating potential of the city. In the 1990s, 53 percent of Charlotte's population growth—in one of the fastest-growing cities in the United States—came through annexation of 68 square miles of land (176 square kilometers).<sup>13</sup>

Lastly, state legislative bodies can pass laws that speak directly about cooperation. For example, in 2003 Michigan adopted the Joint Municipal Planning Act (JMPA), which allowed all general-purpose local governments in the state—counties, cities, townships, and villages—to work together formally to adopt joint comprehensive plans and zoning codes. Together, these plans and codes form the legal foundation for how a local government controls the use of land within its boundaries.<sup>14</sup> If two or more governments chose to cooperate under the JMPA, each would ratify an agreement specifying the terms of its involvement, such as representation on any joint bodies and the imposition of any penalties for exit. With the coordination of land use, several local governments could more effectively leverage the economic and social benefits flowing from a shared natural resource (e.g., a lake, a watershed, a forest), or direct where new commercial or industrial growth occurs, or better match the locations of jobs to housing in an economic region. Interestingly, the local governments in Michigan already had, at least implicitly, the legal ability to cooperate with regard to their planning and zoning activities. In general, most local governments in Michigan have broad powers under the state's home-rule grant. The JMPA, however, provided a clearer signal about the legality of land use cooperation that had not previously existed. Such legal signals about cooperation—or about any powers—can be especially important in states in which the powers of local government are not certain due to the combination of unclear or ambiguous enabling legislation and the use of Dillon's Rule by state courts in interpreting such laws.<sup>15</sup> We will revisit the JMPA at the start of the next section to learn how local government leaders responded to it.

## Why Does Cooperation Only Sometimes Happen?

Even if a state empowers local governments to cooperate, such behavior remains voluntary. It may be incentivized or encouraged, but it is not mandated. Although the state of Michigan anticipated cooperative land use planning and regulation would occur among many of the state's nearly two thousand cities, townships, and villages in the wake of the passage of the JMPA in 2003 (described in the previous section), such activity was exceedingly rare. What this section, and the next, will help us think through is *why*. What were the characteristics of the targeted policy domain (land use planning and regulation), of the local governments in Michigan, and of the local elected officials and administrative staff negotiating cooperation that made its adoption and endurance so uncommon?

We can begin by considering two conceptual lenses that have dominated the study of variation in interlocal cooperation in recent decades. One is the *logic of collective action*.<sup>16</sup> In its simplest terms, the most important component of the logic of collective action is that working together will be more likely where that effort can secure joint gains or benefits that could not otherwise be realized. More plainly, the whole must be greater than the sum of its parts. Beyond the joint gains, selective gains—those that flow to each participant in a cooperative endeavor—would also make collective action more likely. In the case of the JMPA, every story of cooperation began with a well-defined problem that could only be solved through joint work.

In Grand Traverse County, in the far north of Michigan's lower peninsula, land slated for large-scale redevelopment—and positioned to provide economic benefit to the region—was located in both Traverse City and Garfield Township, on the site of a former state hospital.<sup>17</sup> In the city of Marshall and Marshall Township in the south central part of the state, a new expressway interchange likely to draw intensive commercial development similarly straddled land in two neighboring communities. In the southwestern communities of Washtenaw County, several townships and a city were facing how best to absorb growth spreading outward from Detroit and Ann Arbor suburbs while still preserving open space and leveraging existing infrastructure assets.<sup>18</sup> Each of these three situations presented the potential for joint gains by ensuring a comprehensive and orderly approach to development and growth management that would likely be more successful than a haphazard one. However, the possibility of selective benefits—those that would flow directly to each participant local government—was unclear since revenues from property taxes and fees would only flow to one of the participant communities. No ready mechanism for revenue sharing existed. Moreover, many communities throughout the state were facing similar problems and opportunities as those just described but opted not to cooperate. While the potential for joint gains seemed to be a *necessary* precursor to cooperation, the geography of cooperation suggests these gains were not *sufficient* alone to make it happen.

The logic of collective action helps us start to understand the story of interlocal relations, but we also need to think about the actual act of negotiating a cooperative endeavor. This brings us to a second conceptual lens through which interlocal relations are examined: *transaction cost economics*.<sup>19</sup> We can think about economics as being broadly concerned with the act of exchange, or transaction, between producers and consumers. Transaction cost economics is concerned with the costs of such transaction, and with how economic activity is organized in response to variation in these costs. It originally focused on businesses, or firms, and whether they would seek a good or service from another firm in a marketplace of them or simply bring that activity “in house,” and the interaction of firms provides a useful metaphor for understanding how transaction costs work among local governments considering cooperation. General Motors, a major automotive manufacturer, needs a variety of parts in the manufacturing process. It could bring the production of any given part within its own corporate organization or seek that part in the marketplace of automotive

suppliers. Each part would have a cost associated with it—reflected either in the price available on the market or in the marginal in-house production cost. But there is also a cost to the market transaction itself—the real and opportunity costs of negotiating, maintaining, and enforcing a contract with an automotive supplier. When the marketplace transaction costs plus the product cost of a given part outweigh the in-house production costs for it, we would expect General Motors to choose in-house production. Otherwise, it should enter the marketplace and contract with an outside supplier. The decision by General Motors about how to organize its economic activity should be similar to the decision by a local government to pursue interlocal cooperation.

Transaction cost logic asks us to consider how the parties to interlocal cooperation and the environment in which it happens can make the bargaining process easier. As one might intuitively suspect, cooperation tends to be more likely where positive norms of reciprocity—the idea of “tit-for-tat” exchange—and trust exist from a history of successful cooperation between two local governments or the officials representing them. Reciprocity can diminish opportunism and foster cooperation through predictability and repeated exchanges, and trust can help diminish perceptions of risk.<sup>20</sup> The treatment of interlocal agreements through a social network metaphor is reflective of the importance of relationships in understanding patterns of cooperation.<sup>21</sup>

Cooperation also seems to be more likely when the local governments considering undertaking it are very similar demographically, socioeconomically, fiscally, or even politically.<sup>22</sup> The size of the pool of potential partners could conceivably affect information gathering, bargaining over the division of gains, and monitoring or enforcing behavior, although having more available partners has been viewed as both an aid<sup>23</sup> and a challenge<sup>24</sup> to interlocal cooperation. And, lastly, some goods and services are more likely targets of cooperation, and this can also be explained through transaction cost logic. For example, if a service is highly meterable—that is, its fixed and variable costs are well known, as is true for many local services like solid waste management<sup>25</sup>—then we expect negotiation over its contract price and subsequent monitoring to be easier.<sup>26</sup>

What we can glean from this discussion of transaction costs is that even when interlocal cooperation is made explicitly legal by a state and may hold the promise of joint gains, it still might not happen. Again returning to the example of the Joint Municipal Planning Act, we can use transaction cost logic to explain why cooperative planning and zoning were so rare immediately following the law’s passage and why they continue to be exceptional. Land use as a public good or service is not highly meterable, and the bargaining process, revolving not around finding an optimal contract price but rather around defining shared goals and objectives, can be notoriously difficult. Even if one community has more fiscal and infrastructural capacity to handle new land development while another is less able to accommodate such activity, disagreement may exist over the extent to which growth should be directed to one community—especially if it creates a windfall for it.

While many communities in Michigan had a history of working together, these relationships typically extended through municipal managers and their

staff as they negotiated basic service maintenance functions—functions that would not translate easily into land use policymaking. Land use planning and zoning processes would often involve commentary from neighboring communities, but the notion of jointly crafting a comprehensive plan or allowing a joint board of zoning appeals to make important decisions was a step well beyond this. It required not merely welcoming feedback, which could be easily and lawfully ignored, but rather allowing actors from another local government to have potential veto power over important decisions. The reciprocity and trust regarded as key to lowering transaction costs—and that are intrinsic to the notion of intergovernmental relations as human relations mentioned at the start of this chapter—could not be developed incrementally. Not surprisingly, most of the agreements under the JMPA were facilitated by a preexisting regional body, such as a council of governments, with assistance from an outside entity providing funding and expertise.<sup>27</sup>

One could also see in land use a tension between joint gains and homogeneity. The two key benefits of collective action in planning and zoning are cost savings (e.g., the savings from preparing one comprehensive plan, drafting one zoning ordinance, and sharing administrative staff) and, over the longer term, a growing tax base from increased property values. These benefits would be most likely and most attractive for struggling communities—those that have historically lost out in the competition for growth (described briefly in the introductory section)—who would seek out more prosperous and fiscally stable neighboring communities. But communities that are already faring well would have little reason to find cooperation desirable. Why give up autonomy and independence in a policy domain being managed successfully already in exchange for benefits that are either small or uncertain? The resistance to a loss of autonomy is shown well in attempts at joint municipal planning and zoning in Michigan: only in one were the original local planning and zoning bodies and regulations dissolved and replaced completely by their joint counterparts.<sup>28</sup> All others were merely advisory or coordinative.

The problems with land use as a target of cooperation are simply not present for solid waste management, wastewater treatment, snow plowing, and other functions. Some of the goods and services local governments provide, therefore, are much more susceptible to cooperation.<sup>29</sup> The key takeaway from the preceding discussion is that a state can ensure that cooperation is a legal option among local governments, but it is likely only to flourish for *some* goods and services in *some* decision-making contexts. What we have not discussed directly yet are the decision makers who come to the cooperative bargaining table. We consider them in the next section.

## What Are the Characteristics of the Individuals Who Tend to Support Cooperation?

The individual already made a minor appearance in the last section, as one node in the interpersonal relationships that may carry the trust needed to motivate

and sustain cooperation. The individual can also matter, though, because of their own attributes—the interests they have because of the position they occupy in local government, as well as their own political and cultural preferences.

An extension of the collective action and transaction costs logic outlined above is the model of the individual as a rational economic actor, and this model can provide us some insights into why some people are more inclined to cooperation than others. Rational action is simply selection by actors among alternative courses of action in accordance with the maximization of self-interested, material utility. Material utility could be financial—that is, monetary gain—but it could also come in the form of reputation, reelection, or career advancement. The general proposition—to return to the logic of collective action described earlier—is that selective benefits matter: the larger the political incentives and career incentives from favoring cooperation, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. Whereas we focused earlier at the local government level on the treatment of joint and selective benefits, here we are concerned with the economic, political, and other gains of the individual. In other words, we must distinguish between benefits that are public and private.<sup>30</sup>

Interlocal cooperation can flow through individuals who are elected—such as mayors, county sheriffs, city commissions, and town council members<sup>31</sup>—as well as administrative staff such as city managers and town planners. Typically, we regard the primary private benefits for public elected officials as the interest in political power and reelection, and for administrative employees the corresponding interests are in job security and decision-making autonomy.<sup>32</sup> These individual costs and benefits that accrue to individuals and groups are often more able than collective costs and benefits (such as efficiency or scale economies) to explain interlocal cooperation.

One obvious way that the desire for reelection would manifest is in acting in a way viewed as responsive to the local voting public's needs and desires. What makes the local government setting unique is that relatively few local elected officials outside of those from large cities are career politicians who are actively seeking promotion to higher offices at the state or federal level. Many have long tenures and are often from small communities where incurring the wrath of even a few voters may be enough to lose their position on a city council or township board, or simply make their social interactions in the community less pleasant. The small size of local governments in the United States is often overlooked due to the high profile of larger cities. In Michigan, only thirty of the state's nearly two thousand local governments meet a population threshold of fifty thousand. Set the threshold at twenty thousand, and the number of included localities only grows to about one hundred. The same is true for most states. Less than 4 percent of New York's local governments have fifty thousand people. In Missouri, the figure is only about 1 percent. In Florida, the number pushes up to about 15 percent. Even in highly urbanized California, the corresponding figure is just over one-third. Interlocal cooperation in policy areas requiring adjacency and contiguity (as most do) would by necessity engage "small town" political actors.

The potential for a strong social mechanism in small towns may even make up for the lack of monetary reward from interest groups and low electoral turnout.<sup>33</sup> Of course, a more politically active public may have little opinion anyway about interlocal cooperation, which is not typically a hot-button issue (except, perhaps, when it targets land use planning and regulation) and may not even be on the political radars of constituents. A study of Michigan local elected officials found, in part, that officials reported receiving no public input about more than two-fifths of the projects subject to interlocal service arrangements.<sup>34</sup> About a third of the efforts received positive feedback, and another quarter received negative feedback.<sup>35</sup> While this general apathy about governance may suggest that local elected officials perceive an opportunity to exercise their own discretion, nevertheless the risk of reprisal at the voting booth by even a small but motivated group could be problematic. But even if regional benefits from cooperation do occur, they may not allow for credit claiming, the mechanism that leads elected officials to prefer projects that have visible benefits directed at the short-term interests of their general constituency or a specific interest group.<sup>36</sup> Another possibility is that policies might be decided according to partisanship—that local elected officials will choose the alternative most in line with what they think is the prevailing political ideology of constituents. A recent study found that variation in city policies tends to align with the variation in policy conservatism among residents of the cities.<sup>37</sup> But the partisan lines on interlocal cooperation generally are not well understood.<sup>38</sup>

The administrative employee is generally thought to have a longer time horizon than the elected official, and to find more career value in regionalizing activity such as interlocal cooperation. These actors also tend to exist in well-connected networks with one another across local boundaries, creating the opportunity for administrative conjunctions to form along which information and trust can flow, or even simply imparting professional ideals consistent with the pursuit of interlocal cooperation.<sup>39</sup> Administrative actors also tend to have a strong public-service ethos, perhaps making them more open to searching for alternative modes of service delivery in the pursuit of efficiency or effectiveness. We tend to think, based on all of the above reasons, that the council–manager form of government is more hospitable to cooperative endeavors.<sup>40</sup>

A final consideration with regard to any actor—whether political or administrative—involved in decision making about cooperation is whether that actor might simply be predisposed to working together with others. For example, some might have a cultural worldview that consistently suggests cooperation is a good idea—irrespective of whether it affords clear joint or selective benefits to them as individuals or to their communities.<sup>41</sup> Recent studies of interlocal cooperation have increasingly noted the possibility of behaviors that are not motivated by self-interest, such as a simple interest in helping a neighboring community.<sup>42</sup> The difficulty with cultural worldviews, though, is that they are very hard to discern and do not even consistently travel with outward signals such as partisan identity.

Returning a final time to the example of joint land use planning and regulation in Michigan, we can use this section to glean some final insights about its

lack of uptake by local governments. Whereas most targets of cooperation are apolitical, land use can be a notoriously political battleground. But this battleground tends to be over what happens within local boundaries in the placement of unwanted or undesirable land uses. With regard to the cooperative, regional pursuit of land use planning, the evidence is decidedly mixed.<sup>43</sup> The outcomes in Michigan, though, suggest that land use cooperation either carried no political reward or that at least some members of the voting public were concerned about any loss of independence and autonomy in making land use decisions. While administrative staff may have been attracted by the efficiency gains from working together and by the appeal of claiming career credit for a successful regional comprehensive plan or zoning ordinance, many communities in Michigan have high turnover in their planning and zoning units or do not have full-time planning staff and instead rely on outside consultants for these needs.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored the legal spaces that states create for interlocal cooperation among counties, cities, towns, and other general-purpose local governments. We discussed how state governments can and do use legislation to expressly enable cooperation in a wide array of policy domains—from wastewater treatment and snow plowing to land use and economic development. We also reviewed how states can indirectly influence the likelihood of cooperation versus competition by shaping the service responsibilities of local governments, the revenues available to them, and their ability to extend their boundaries through annexation. After explaining the cooperative space that states shape, we spent some time thinking through how the environment within which decision making about cooperation happens, and the decision makers working in it, can influence whether cooperation actually does happen or not. We looked at the importance of joint and selective gains from cooperation, and treated at length how the costs of the cooperative transaction balance against these. We finished by thinking about the material incentives of decision makers, whether political, careerist, or cultural.

The three questions that motivated this chapter—*What does state law say about interlocal relations? What are some of the contexts in which cooperation tends to happen? What are the characteristics of the individuals who tend to support cooperation?*—can be viewed as basic guideposts for you in a professional career. If you work in local government, you are now aware that cooperation is often a very real possibility, and you can be thoughtful about who you target as a potential partner or collaborator and how you can construct a space that is more amenable to cooperation. For example, you might work to create interlocal interpersonal relationships that allow the development of norms of reciprocity and trust, starting with smaller and less risky cooperative efforts before tackling more difficult ones. Or you might make an effort to persuade the public of the advantages of cooperation, if these do exist, to ensure they are politically supportive of it when needed. These are not panaceas that will guarantee cooperation flourishes, but evidence suggests they will be helpful. If

you work in state government, you will also be more aware now of how laws can influence the competitive and cooperative impulses of local governments and that simply enabling cooperation is likely not enough to secure it as an outcome. Incentives may be needed in the short term to serve as a clear selective gain for governments participating in cooperation, or educational efforts may need to be undertaken.

## Discussion Questions

1. Think about the laws in your home state and about the county, city, or other local government in which you live. Is your community able to cooperate with its neighbors? Which policy areas can this happen in? You may need to explore your state's compiled laws to find the answer.
2. Assume your home community can cooperate in any policy area in which they already have the authority to act. Think of one or two policy areas—land use, economic development, affordable housing, storm water management, road maintenance, or any other—in which cooperation would be beneficial. Articulate what both the joint gains (those that arise from working together) and the selective benefits (those that flow to your community and to the individuals working in it) would be.
3. Imagine you are able to structure the cooperative decision-making process for question 2, from the actors involved to the nature of meetings, voting, and the like. What would it look like and why?

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Christopher V. Hawkins, "Competition and Cooperation: Local Government Joint Ventures for Economic Development," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 32, no. 2 (2010): 253–75.
- <sup>2</sup> Anna Rossi, "Regionalizing the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, the Effects of Privatization on Metro Detroit Residents and the Importance of Community Control," *Journal of Law and Society* 17, no. 2 (2015): 59–85.
- <sup>3</sup> Kiki Caruson and Susan A. MacManus, "Disaster Vulnerabilities: How Strong a Push toward Regionalism and Intergovernmental Cooperation?," *American Review of Public Administration* 38, no. 3 (2008): 286–306.
- <sup>4</sup> Deil S. Wright, "Intergovernmental Relations: An Analytical Overview," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 416, no. 1 (1974): 1–16.
- <sup>5</sup> Adams B. Nager, Allison S. Lowe Reed, and W. Scott Langford, "Catching the Whale: A Comparison of Place Promotion Strategies through the Lens of Amazon HQ2," *Geography Compass* 13, no. 9 (2019): e12462.
- <sup>6</sup> Rolf Pendall, "Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 66, no. 2 (2000): 125–42.
- <sup>7</sup> Yunji Kim and Mildred E. Warner, "Pragmatic Municipalism: Local Government Service Delivery after the Great Recession," *Public Administration* 94, no. 3 (2016): 789–805.
- <sup>8</sup> Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser, "Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy? Historical Patterns in American State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (2010): 151–70.
- <sup>9</sup> Ann O'M. Bowman and Richard C. Kearney, "Are US Cities Losing Power and Authority? Perceptions of Local Government Actors," *Urban Affairs Review* 48, no. 4 (2012): 528–46.
- <sup>10</sup> Mildred E. Warner, "Local Government Restructuring in a Time of Fiscal Stress," in *Public Jobs and Political Agendas: The Public Sector in an Era of Economic Stress*, ed. Daniel J. B. Mitchell, 41–58 (Champaign, IL: Labor and Employment Relations Association, 2012).

- <sup>11</sup> Jered B. Carr and Richard C. Feiock, eds., *City-County Consolidation and Its Alternatives: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape* (London: Routledge, 2016).
- <sup>12</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, "Census of Governments," 2019, <https://www.census.gov/govs>.
- <sup>13</sup> Gerald Ingalls and Gary Rassel, "Political Fragmentation, Municipal Incorporation and Annexation in a High Growth Urban Area: The Case of Charlotte, North Carolina," *North Carolina Geographer* 13 (2005): 17–30.
- <sup>14</sup> Thomas Skuzinski, *The Risk of Regional Governance: Cultural Theory and Interlocal Cooperation* (New York: Routledge, 2017).
- <sup>15</sup> Jesse J. Richardson Jr., "Dillon's Rule Is from Mars, Home Rule Is from Venus: Local Government Autonomy and the Rules of Statutory Construction," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 41, no. 4 (2011): 662–85.
- <sup>16</sup> Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- <sup>17</sup> Skuzinski, *Risk of Regional Governance*.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Oliver E. Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression," *American Economic Review* 100, no. 3 (2010): 673–90.
- <sup>20</sup> Manoj K. Shrestha and Richard C. Feiock, "Transaction Cost, Exchange Embeddedness, and Interlocal Cooperation in Local Public Goods Supply," *Political Research Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (2011): 573–87.
- <sup>21</sup> Kurt Thurmaier and Curtis Wood, "Interlocal Agreements as Overlapping Social Networks: Picket-Fence Regionalism in Metropolitan Kansas City," *Public Administration Review* 62, no. 5 (2002): 585–98.
- <sup>22</sup> Minsun Song, Hyung Jun Park, and Kyujin Jung, "Do Political Similarities Facilitate Interlocal Collaboration?," *Public Administration Review* 78, no. 2 (2018): 261–69.
- <sup>23</sup> Richard C. Feiock, Annette Steinacker, and Hyung Jun Park, "Institutional Collective Action and Economic Development Joint Ventures," *Public Administration Review* 69, no. 2 (2009): 256–70.
- <sup>24</sup> Manoj K. Shrestha and Richard C. Feiock, "Governing US Metropolitan Areas: Self-Organizing and Multiplex Service Networks," *American Politics Research* 37, no. 5 (2009): 801–23.
- <sup>25</sup> Hugo Consciência Silvestre, Rui Cunha Marques, and Ricardo Corrêa Gomes, "Joined-Up Government of Utilities: A Meta-Review on a Public–Public Partnership and Inter-municipal Cooperation in the Water and Wastewater Industries," *Public Management Review* 20, no. 4 (2018): 607–31.
- <sup>26</sup> Trevor L. Brown and Matthew Potoski, "Transaction Costs and Institutional Explanations for Government Service Production Decisions," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 13, no. 4 (2003): 441–68.
- <sup>27</sup> Skuzinski, *Risk of Regional Governance*.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Germà Bel and Mildred E. Warner, "Factors Explaining Inter-municipal Cooperation in Service Delivery: A Meta-Regression Analysis," *Journal of Economic Policy Reform* 19, no. 2 (2016): 91–115.
- <sup>30</sup> Richard C. Feiock, "Rational Choice and Regional Governance," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2007): 47–63.
- <sup>31</sup> Eric S. Zeemering, "Governing Interlocal Cooperation: City Council Interests and the Implications for Public Management," *Public Administration Review* 68, no. 4 (2008): 731–41.
- <sup>32</sup> Richard C. Feiock and Jered B. Carr, "Incentives, Entrepreneurs, and Boundary Change: A Collective Action Framework," *Urban Affairs Review* 36, no. 3 (2001): 382–405.
- <sup>33</sup> Ronald J. Oakerson, "The Study of Metropolitan Governance," in *Metropolitan Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation*, ed. Richard C. Feiock, 17–45 (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
- <sup>34</sup> Zeemering, "Governing Interlocal Cooperation."
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>36</sup> Richard C. Feiock, Moon-Gi Jeong, and Jaehoon Kim, "Credible Commitment and Council-Manager Government: Implications for Policy Instrument Choices," *Public Administration Review* 63, no. 5 (2003): 616–25.
- <sup>37</sup> Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw, "Representation in Municipal Government," *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 3 (2014): 605–41.
- <sup>38</sup> Skuzinski, *Risk of Regional Governance*.
- <sup>39</sup> H. George Frederickson, "The Repositioning of American Public Administration," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 32, no. 4 (1999): 701–12.
- <sup>40</sup> Jered B. Carr, Kelly LeRoux, and Manoj Shrestha, "Institutional Ties, Transaction Costs, and External Service Production," *Urban Affairs Review* 44, no. 3 (2009): 403–27.
- <sup>41</sup> Skuzinski, *Risk of Regional Governance*.
- <sup>42</sup> Austin M. Aldag and Mildred Warner, "Cooperation, not Cost Savings: Explaining Duration of Shared Service Agreements," *Local Government Studies* 44, no. 3 (2018): 350–70.
- <sup>43</sup> Robert W. Wassmer and Edward L. Lascher Jr., "Who Supports Local Growth and Regional Planning to Deal with Its Consequences?," *Urban Affairs Review* 41, no. 5 (2006): 621–45.